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During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. He promised an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

This contrast encapsulates the core tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this aligns with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson stated this, noting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This pivot is consequential, but experts caution it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Strains

Differing from his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Targeted Intervention

A similar confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Some analysts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” she added.